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Atypical Work and Employment Continuity
Atypical employment arrangements such as agency temporary work and contracting have long 
been criticized as offering more precarious and unstable work than regular employment. Using 
data from two datasets – the CAEAS and the NLSY79 – we determine whether workers who 
take such jobs rather than regular employment, or the alternative of continued job search, 
subsequently experience greater or lesser employment continuity. Observed differences between 
the various working arrangements are starkest when we do not account for unobserved individual 
heterogeneity. Controlling for the latter, we report that the advantage of regular  work over 
atypical work and atypical work over continued joblessness dissipates.
JEL Classifications:  J40, J60, J63, M50
Keywords: atypical   work,   open-ended   work,   employment   continuity,   unemployment, 
inactivity
 I.  Introduction 
Analysis of the impact of atypical work (e.g. contracting, consulting, on-call, and temporary 
agency work) on the job prospects of its incumbents has passed through a number of stages in 
both the United States and Europe. This is nowhere more obvious than in the case of workers 
employed by temporary help agency firms. Most if not all of the early literature on temporary 
work arrangement reached pessimistic conclusions. Thus, the jobs in question were viewed as 
dead-end, offering atypical workers little opportunity or incentive to invest in themselves or to 
develop productive job search networks. Accordingly, such workers were characterized as 
confronting continuing job instability and ongoing skill deficits (Parker, 1994; Nollen, 1996; 
Blank, 1998).
More recently the research pendulum has if anything swung the other way, and in Europe 
may have helped hinder the passage of  legislation seeking to regulate inter al. the pay, working 
time, rest periods, holidays, and holiday pay of agency temporary workers.
1 This new, revisionist 
literature – much of it unpublished (see, for example, García-Pérez and Muñoz-Bullón, 2002; 
Ichino et al., 2004; Kvasnicka, 2005; Zijl et al., 2004) has tended to suggest to the contrary that 
temporary jobs facilitate labor market advancement, reducing the time their incumbents spend in 
largely unproductive job search (where temporary agencies have lower screening and termination 
costs than conventional direct-hire employment, this may facilitate the hiring of individuals who 
might not have found any work in their absence), while also leading to longer term job 
attachment (via heightened human capital investment and improved labor market networks). 
There is, however, no real consensus and the new literature has come under challenge on 
technical grounds.
2  Further, the alternative work arrangement most closely studied, agency 
temporary workers, represents a minority among the totality of atypical jobs that also include 
direct-hire temporaries, on call-workers, and those engaged in contracting and consulting. Note 
that agency temporaries make up just 7 percent of atypical work in the United States.
Accordingly, our understanding of the consequences of the historically rapid growth in 
atypical work, facilitated in large part by structural changes in the economy (see, for example, 
1 Two so-called atypical worker directives were enacted into law in the EU in 1997 and 1999 (see, respectively, 
Official Journal, 1998, 1999). A third directive on the working conditions of temporary workers was introduced by 
the European Commission in 2002 (Commission of the European Communities, 2002), but little definitive progress 
on this controversial draft legislation has been made since then.
2 Principally, inadequate modeling of the likely nonrandom selection of workers with different earnings capacities 
into atypical work (see below).
1Abraham and Taylor, 1996; Segal and Sullivan, 1997a; Garen, 1999), is both contested and 
substantially incomplete. The goal of the present exercise is to help clarify one aspect of the 
impact of atypical employment on the labor market prospects of its incumbents by investigating 
their employment continuity.
3 In this context, the main contribution of the paper is inclusiveness 
rather than methodological. That is to say, we investigate the  full range  of atypical work 
arrangements, not just a subset thereof, and provide  updated  estimates of their effect on 
employment continuity using pooled data and panel estimates. 
We conclude that atypical workers are indeed a diverse lot, such that the continuing focus 
on temporary agency employment can be misleading. Some categories of atypical work are 
shown to enjoy no less employment continuity than regular employment, even if others do not. 
In each case, however, unobserved individual heterogeneity casts a long shadow, blunting if not 
overturning the sharper edges of differences between the various categories of atypical work and 
regular employment. But selecting atypical work may yield greater employment continuity than 
the alternative of continued job search.
II.  Existing Research 
Prior to the publication in 1995 of the Contingent and Alternative Employment Arrangement 
Supplement  (CAEAS)   to  the  Current  Population  Survey.  U.S.  research  focused  almost 
exclusively on a single alternative work arrangement, namely, agency temporary work.
4 Agency 
temps were typically identified by their self-reported industrial code, giving rise to potential 
measurement error in circumstances where workers reported the industrial classification of the 
client firm rather than the temporary help agency. This early empirical literature reported that 
temporary help service workers experienced shorter (and coincidentally poorly-paid) spells of 
employment compared with workers in other industries (see, for example, Davis-Blake and Uzzi, 
1993; Parker, 1994). 
In recognition of the limitations of worker-provided data prior to the CAEAS, Segal and 
Sullivan (1997b) examined the impact of temporary work on employment continuity using data 
from the state of Washington’s unemployment insurance program that maintains quarterly 
records on the employment history of workers covered by the system, where that information is 
3 We do not consider earnings development in the present paper, but see Addison and Surfield (2007), for one such 
treatment, together with the papers reviewed in the next section.
4 Although questions on atypical work arrangements, as well as other work forms such as self-employment, were 
introduced into the 1994 National Longitudinal Survey of Youth and continued until 1998. 
2reported by the employer. Since the authors have longitudinal data (for 1984 to 1994), they 
observe repeated spells of employment for the same individual, allowing them to include an 
individual-specific intercept in their regression analysis and thereby control for unobserved 
factors that might influence the decision to become a temporary worker.
The results obtained by Segal and Sullivan were mostly supportive of the earlier 
literature. That is, temporary help service workers were found to experience significantly shorter 
employment durations than those of workers in other industries. Moreover, roughly 40 percent of 
the observed spells of temporary employment ended with the worker entering into either 
unemployment or exiting from the labor force. Among those who remained in employment, 
however, more than one half of temporary employment spells ending within six months were 
followed by regular employment. Finally, the inclusion of individual fixed effects had little 
impact  on  the  duration of  temporary  employment,  implying  that  unobserved  individual 
heterogeneity did not contribute materially to the differential employment continuity of agency 
temporaries.
A more positive evaluation of temporary employment is reported by Lane et al. (2003) in 
an analysis of Survey of Income and Program Participation panel data, 1990-93. The authors 
seek to match at-risk (of welfare) temporary workers – defined as those who either received 
public assistance or had family income below 150 percent of the poverty line in the previous year 
– with control groups assembled from the regular worker population, using propensity score 
techniques based on demographic characteristics and employment histories (see Heckman et al., 
1997, 1998). They find that although individuals who experienced a spell  in temporary 
employment had worse employment (and earnings) outcomes than those who worked in open-
ended employment, they did considerably better than similar workers who had a spell of 
unemployment. Specifically, comparing the unemployed who found temporary employment after 
one month with similar workers who were not employed in either month, the former had a 69 
percent chance of being employed one year later and the latter only a 35 percent chance. 
However, Lane et al. (2003, p. 598) do caution  that the comparison groups were not well 
matched on all characteristics (namely, work history variables). 
 The two most recent U.S. studies also focus narrowly on the temporary employment 
option for disadvantaged workers. They reach differing conclusions. In an analysis of welfare 
recipients in North Carolina and Missouri – using samples for 1993/97 and 1997 respectively, 
3observed eight quarters before and eight quarters after the sample period(s) – Heinrich, Mueser, 
and Troske (2005) again report that individuals who go to work for temporary agency firms fare 
substantially better than those who fail initially to find work. Moreover, although recipients in 
temporary jobs receive lower pay and are more likely to be on welfare in two years than are other 
employed recipients (even if they do not seem to have materially fewer quarters of positive 
earnings) these differences are small once the authors control for individual characteristics and 
potential selection bias in the decision to take an agency temporary job.
5 No less important, the 
earnings of temporary workers in subsequent years increase faster than those in other industries. 
After two years, then, temps have earnings close to those of other workers, and they are no less 
likely to be employed. Only in terms of welfare recidivism is their performance inferior to 
regular   workers   –   and,  to   repeat,   for   all   outcomes   it   remains  much   better   than   for 
initially/currently unemployed workers. The bottom line from this study is that temporary jobs 
provide a path to other industries with greater employment stability and higher earnings.
Somewhat different results are provided by Autor and Houseman (2005) in a unique 
analysis of administrative data from the Michigan Work First program for welfare recipients that 
are linked with that state’s UI wage records data base. Payroll earnings and employment 
continuity (quarters of employment) are charted for up to two years. The sample comprises 
38,689 Work First spells initiated between 1999 and 2003. The study is notable for its quasi-
experimental status. Under Michigan’s workfare plan, employment services are provided by 
nonprofit private or public sector agencies whose placement practices vary significantly but who 
otherwise offer similar services. In circumstances where multiple such contractors are involved 
in the provision of services within a geographic district they take turns in enrolling applicants. 
Accordingly, the distribution of participants among contractors is random, providing a new 
experimental context for the evaluation of the employment service of temporary employment.
Autor and Houseman obtain similar results to the modern (welfare) literature for simple 
OLS specifications. That is to say, post-assignment earnings for temps considerably exceeded the 
earnings of the initially unemployed over time as did their employment continuity, while 
differences between direct hires and temps were muted. However, the authors’ instrumental 
variables regressions (wherein contractor-by-year dummy variables replace the direct hire and 
5 The selection model is identified through the exclusion of various measures such as the county unemployment rate, 
industrial structure, and industry-specific earnings from the earnings equation but not the selection into employment 
equation.
4temporary work status variables) produce very different results once one proceeds beyond the 
first post-assignment quarter. And the disparities increase in the follow-up period. Thus, for 
example, over a two-year interval temporary help job placements are associated with earnings 
losses  and  insignificant  increases  in employment continuity vis-à-vis  those  receiving no 
placement, while direct hire placements produce major increases in both earnings and total 
quarters of employment. The impression that temporary jobs do not improve and may actually 
harm labor market outcomes is sharpened by the authors’ analysis of marginal treatment effects 
which suggests among other things that marginal temporary worker gains in earnings and 
employment during the first year come at the cost of sacrificed earnings and employment in 
direct-hire jobs. Any first-quarter benefits associated with ‘temping’ are eliminated within the 
first year. In sharp contrast, direct-hire placements point to strong and continuing gains in 
earnings and employment, with the suggestion that welfare recipients might be better advised to 
eschew temporary help jobs and search for open-ended employment at the outset, agency 
temporary employment being a poor substitute for continued unemployment.
The issue raised by this sole experimental study is whether non-experimental studies are 
biased by the selection of workers into job types on the basis of unobserved characteristics or 
simply   reflect   a   difference   between   marginal   and   average   treatment   effects.   We   note 
parenthetically that the authors of this careful treatment pay especial attention to eliminating 
other  factors that might  influence their results, namely, unmeasured  differences between 
contractors and the issue of parameter instability. 
It is appropriate at this stage to briefly mention a number of European studies of the 
effects of temporary employment. Despite the regulatory actions of the EU (foot)noted earlier, 
the most recent European research points in a fairly optimistic direction. For Britain, in an 
analysis of job duration and reason for exit using data from the British Household Panel Survey 
for 1991-97, Booth et al. (2002) report that fixed-term contracts – if not seasonal/casual 
employment, the other category of temporary work examined – provide effective stepping stones 
to permanent jobs, while any costs in the form of reduced wages are transitory especially for 
females. For Italy, using propensity score matching methods, Ichino et al. (2004) find that 
relative to starting off unemployed being in a temporary help job significantly improves the 
probability of the worker finding permanent employment within 18 months. Finally, for the 
Netherlands, Zijl et al. (2004) advance a formal structural model of transitions into open-ended 
5employment and report that taking a temporary job materially reduces jobless duration while 
facilitating subsequent job continuity. To begin with, newly unemployed temporary workers have 
a somewhat lower rate of transition into regular employment than do unemployed workers but 
after 18 months the escape rate from temporary employment exceeds that from unemployment, 
suggesting  an accretion of human capital  assets  and  the  formation of  social  networks. 
Interestingly, to the extent that they use temporary work, the stepping stone effect is found to be 
somewhat higher for lower educated individuals than for their more educated counterparts and 
for male ethnic minorities than for the native population.
Thus far we have seen atypical work presents a rather different and more optimistic 
assessment of the prospects of temporary agency workers than earlier analyses. To be sure there 
are some disagreements (chiefly between Autor and Houseman and the rest over the efficacy of 
non-experimental methods) so that the question of the robustness of the new literature is not 
settled. Moreover, the near exclusive focus on temporary agency employment presents only a 
partial picture of atypical work. Agency temporaries account for about one percent of the U.S. 
workforce, while direct-hire temporaries and independent contractors each constitute around five 
percent of the U.S. workforce (see Cohany, 1996; Polivka, 1996). 
In concluding this literature review, therefore, we turn to the study that considers a more 
comprehensive range of alternative work arrangements. Taking advantage of the then newly 
administered CAEAS, Houseman and Polivka (2000) include in their investigation not only 
agency temporaries but also direct-hire temporaries, on-call workers, contract workers, and 
independent contractors. They were able to identify the labor market outcomes of workers by 
matching the February 1995 CAEAS to the subsequent CPS surveys for March 1995 and 
February 1996. Since their primary focus was upon the job stability associated with atypical 
work, those initially observed as being unemployed or out of the labor force were excluded from 
their analysis.
Their empirical results seem to be more in line with the earlier U.S. research literature. 
Specifically, they find that many atypical workers are likely to find themselves transitioning into 
both labor market inactivity and joblessness at rates that are significantly greater than those 
observed for (full-time) regular  employment. But these effects are not  uniform. Agency 
temporaries fare the poorest: the likelihood they will be unemployed after one year is roughly 
two to eight percentage points greater than is the case for those engaged in open-ended 
6employment. For direct-hire temps and on-call workers the corresponding increases in the 
probability of entering joblessness are three to four and four to five percentage points, 
respectively. Only independent contractors are (about one percentage point) less likely to be 
observed unemployed than are regular workers.
Two concerns arise from the literature on atypical work. First, most of the studies either 
focus narrowly on just one type of atypical work (most often agency temporary employment) or 
are otherwise restricted in scope (being based on single states or groups of economically 
disadvantaged individuals). Disagreement about the implications of atypical work might reflect 
these restrictions. Second, the material in the major study examining a wider range of atypical 
work types (Houseman and Polivka, 2000) is now somewhat dated. Therefore we need to 
determine whether its findings are supported by newer CAEAS/CPS information. Even more 
importantly, we also include those initially unemployed and out of the labor force to directly test 
the effects of the various forms of atypical work on employment continuity rather than job 
continuity. Finally, we shall examine a truly longitudinal data set – the National Longitudinal 
Survey of Youth, 1979 Cohort (NLSY79) – that also permits investigation of a wide range of 
alternative work arrangements while allowing us to address the nonrandom selection of workers 
with different earnings capacities and labor market opportunities.
6
III.  Data and Methodology
The   Contingent   and   Alternative   Employment   Arrangement   Supplement   to   the   Current 
Population Survey (CAEAS/CPS) is a large, nationally representative dataset. It was first 
conducted in February 1995 and biennially since then. One key advantage of the CAEAS/CPS 
resides in its large number of observations, which is important given the relatively small number 
of workers engaged in some atypical work arrangements (contract and on-call workers in 
particular). The data contained in the parent CPS surveys conducted one year later is used to 
identify the labor market outcomes of workers.
Our second and overlapping source of data is the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, 
1979 Cohort (NLSY79). Although the NLSY79 tracks a narrower age cohort – it covers workers 
aged 29 to 34 years in 1994 – than the CAEAS/CPS, it does contain richer information on labor 
6 The data on atypical work arrangements contained within the NLSY79 have been accorded little attention by 
researchers. Exceptions are Rothstein (1996) and Ferber and Waldfogel (1998), neither of whom exploit data on the 
different types of alternative work arrangements.
7market histories. In particular, the weekly diaries maintained by respondents allow us to more 
precisely determine the length of time they have been employed. The NLSY79 also allows us to 
follow individuals for longer time intervals and potentially to draw stronger inferences about the 
labor market implications of atypical work.
The CAEAS/CPS Data
We extracted one cross section each from the four CAEAS/CPS surveys issued from 1997 until 
2005.
7 Each cross section was then linked to the parent CPS issued exactly one year later. We 
also link the CAEAS to the Displaced Worker Survey (DWS), conducted in the February of the 
following year for three of the four cross sections. In 2006, the DWS was administered in 
January, meaning that in matching the 2005 CAEAS to the two surveys – the January DWS and 
the February CPS – there emerge slight differences in sample sizes. In each case, we used the 
matching algorithm outlined in Madrian and Lefgren (1999) in linking the CAES to these 
subsequent surveys.
The rotational design of the CPS has households being actively interviewed for four 
months, rotated out for eight, and then re-interviewed for four additional months prior to being 
permanently rotated out of the survey. This pattern limits the number of households identified in 
the CAEAS that can be matched to the survey that is administered one year later. Since there is 
no overlap of individuals contained in each of the four cross sections, we combine them into 
single pooled sample.
We classify workers into one of nine mutually exclusive work and non-work categories. 
The first two work arrangements pertain to open-ended employment and comprise  regular 
workers and screened workers. Following the convention established in the literature, we next 
distinguish  between  five  types   of  atypical  employment:  agency  temporaries,  direct-hire 
temporaries, on-call workers, contract company workers, and independent contractors. Our two 
residual categories are those initially reported as being unemployed or out of the labor force. 
Definitions for each of these work arrangements are given in Table 1.
(Table 1 near here)
Using regular workers as one basis for comparison, we can directly assess if atypical 
work offers employment that is more (or less) stable than open-ended employment. Use of the 
7 Budgetary cuts prevented the CAEAS/CPS from being issued in 2003, while the 1995 CAEAS/CPS was not usable 
given a change in the household identifier in September 1995 which prevented us from matching it with the 
subsequent CPS survey.
8initially unemployed as a second reference category, allows us to determine whether being 
employed in an atypical arrangement affords workers with greater (or lesser) employment 
continuity than results from continued search.
Matching the CAEAS data with the CPS and the DWS provides us with two distinct 
measures of a worker’s employment continuity. These are respectively the labor market status of 
the worker one year after the CAEAS and whether or not the worker was displaced over the 
course of the following year. Beginning with the former measure, the three possible outcomes 
identified in the subsequent CPS are:  employed one year later, unemployed one year later, or out 
of the labor force one year later. A multinomial logit choice model is adopted to analyze the 
employment outcome. Ceteris paribus, the multinomial logit will provide us with an estimate of 
the probability of observing an individual with a particular characteristic in a given outcome 
relative  to the probability of observing an individual with a reference characteristic being 
observed in that outcome. For example, we can determine how much more (or less) likely an 
agency temporary will be employed one year later than will a regular worker. Again note that 
two reference characteristics are to be used.
For our second measure of employment continuity, we construct a dichotomous variable 
equal to one if, at some point between the CAEAS and DWS interviews, a worker lost his or her 
job due to displacement (zero otherwise). A worker is displaced if the job was lost due to slack 
work, plant closure, or the elimination of the shift or position. A standard (dichotomous) logit 
model is used to analyze the displacement phenomenon/variable. As was the case with the 
multinomial logit, two different reference categories are again used.
Turning to the regressors, in addition to a worker’s employment arrangement, we have 
data on traditional demographical controls such as age, education, ethnicity, and gender. We also 
include information on the number of children in the household under six years of age on the 
grounds that atypical work offers individuals with pre-school children a more flexible work form 
potentially better suited to their needs than does regular employment (e.g. Rothstein, 1996). If so, 
it would not be surprising to see a diminished employment continuity attaching to atypical work. 
Next, for those who held a job of some kind, be it open-ended work or atypical employment, we 
can also include controls for industry and occupation (set equal to zero for those individuals we 
initially observe as being unemployed or out of the labor force). The CAEAS data also allow us 
to construct a variable that is analogous to a worker’s tenure (in years). For those engaged in 
9regular, screened and direct-hire temporary work, it is the actual tenure acquired by the worker 
with his or her employer. For agency temporaries and contract company workers, the variable 
measures the number of years that the individual has been with their agency/contract company, 
which may not be the same as the tenure accumulated with the client firm reported at the time of 
the contingent survey. For independent contractors and on-call workers, the variable simply 
measures the time incumbents have been engaged in these work arrangements.
8
The characteristics of the workers in the various work and non-work categories are 
similar to those obtained by earlier researchers (e.g. Polivka et al., 2000). To address the effect of 
the demographic characteristics on the probability of observing a worker in a given work 
arrangement, we estimated a set of probit equations in which the reference work category is 
open-ended (regular and screened workers) employment. Full details are available from the 
authors upon request, but the salient results are as follows. First, age has a significant impact on 
the likelihood that a worker will be observed in an atypical work arrangement. For each atypical 
work arrangement save one – independent contractors – atypical workers are significantly 
younger than their regular counterparts. Second, agency and direct hire temporary workers are 
more likely to be blacks and Hispanics than are regular workers, and conversely for independent 
contractors. Third, although single females are less likely to be atypical workers this is not the 
case for their married counterparts who are significantly more likely to be agency and direct-hire 
temporaries, on-call workers, and independent contractors. Fourth, the effects of educational 
attainments on the rates of holding the various types of atypical work are mixed. Although more 
highly educated individuals are more likely to be independent contractors, there is otherwise no 
consistent effect of education on the likelihood that workers will be engaged in temporary, on-
call, or contract company work. Fifth, for those who are initially observed to be out of the labor 
force  or  unemployed,  the  pattern  of  findings  is   more  consistent.  Such  individuals  are 
disproportionately minorities, married females (though not females per se), and less well 
educated, while age is significantly and negatively correlated with labor market withdrawal. 
Finally, although the number of children under six years of age is only loosely associated with 
atypical employment, their presence is strongly positively associated with the residual, non-work 
8 A final restriction imposed on the data, other than the exclusion of individuals with any missing information, was 
the excision of workers under (over) the age of twenty-five (sixty-five) years, so as to avoid contamination arising 
from more fundamental differences in labor market attachment.
10categories: each pre-school child increases the likelihood that an individual will be initially 
unemployed or out of the labor market by between two and five percentage points, respectively.
The NLSY79 Data
Our second data set is used to derive additional insights into atypical work and its stability. 
Specifically, the NLSY data permit examination of a longer period of time – up to four years – to 
evaluate the implications of atypical work for at least some aspects of employment continuity. 
The present study exploits the 1994 to 2002 waves of NLSY79.
We also use these data to address one of the concerns attaching to the use of the matched 
CAEAS/CPS data, namely, the potential bias that arises from our inability to completely match 
respondents from one survey to another. For example, workers who were initially unemployed 
may have moved to take advantage of better labor market opportunities elsewhere and thus be 
missing from subsequent CPS surveys. (We note parenthetically, that respondents are selected for 
inclusion in the CPS on the basis of their address, with those who leave the address being 
replaced in the survey by the new occupants.) In such cases, the CAEAS/CPS comparisons will 
over-state the potential benefits of atypical work over joblessness.
As shown in Table 1, we can classify individuals into workers into one of eight mutually 
exclusive work and non-work arrangements. As is the case for the CAEAS/CPS data, we can 
identify regular workers, screened workers, agency temporaries, and direct-hire temporaries. 
But the NLSY79 does not distinguish between contract workers and independent contractors, 
only allowing us to work with  an aggregated  contractors/consultants  category. A further 
difference from the CAEAS is the category of other work types. The most common such work 
type reported by individuals to the NLSY interviewers is self-employment. Although not 
traditionally considered to be atypical work, this category shares one key characteristic with it: 
the lack of a guarantee, implicit or explicit, of continued employment. The two residual 
categories are again the initially unemployed and initially out of the labor force.  
From the NLSY79 we fashion our third, additional measure of employment continuity: 
the fraction of time between two interviews that the respondent reports being employed. We use 
the data contained in the work diaries maintained by the NLSY respondents to construct the new 
dependent variable  fraction of time employed. It is obtained by taking the weeks of time 
employed between interviews reported by the individual and dividing it by the number of weeks 
between interviews. This standardized ratio is, arguably, a better gauge of employment continuity 
11than is labor market status at a single point in time. We have repeated observations on 
individuals’ employment spells; that is we can measure the fraction of time a worker is employed 
over two and four year intervals after each of 1994, 1996 and 1998 interviews.
9 
These repeated observations allow us to adopt panel estimation techniques in analyzing 
the fraction of time a worker has been employed. In addition, we can address the concerns raised 
by Segal and Sullivan (1997b) that workers employed in atypical work may quickly transition 
out of such employment well within the two year interval. In our least squares models, we are 
assuming that the work arrangement in which a worker is initially employed influences his or her 
subsequent  employment   continuity.   Workers  may  of   course   be   engaged  in   a   different 
employment arrangement at the beginning of each two-/four-year period. 
The work diaries maintained by the NLSY79 respondents also provide us with some 
additional human capital controls not found in the CAEAS/CPS data. Specifically, we have 
direct data on a worker’s (cumulative) general labor market experience as well as his or her 
tenure on the current job.
 The NLSY79 gives the actual number of weeks that the respondent has 
been employed since entering the survey, as well as the actual number of weeks employed with 
the current employer (or employment type in the case of contractors/consultants and other work 
types). Moreover, we can also form a standardized measure of the number of jobs held by 
individuals by dividing the reported total number of jobs held by (cumulative) general labor 
market experience. This  jobs  measure can be also viewed as an inverse proxy for the 
attractiveness of the worker to an employer. Finally, the selfsame restrictions stemming from 
incomplete demographic, industrial, and occupational characteristics apply here as for the 
CAEAS/CPS samples.
Finally, as regards the characteristics of atypical workers in the NLSY79, these broadly 
mimic the CAEAS. Thus, for example, agency and direct-hire temporaries occupy one end of the 
spectrum, disproportionately made up of minorities, married females and, on this occasion, 
lesser-educated workers, with contractors/consultants occupying the other. In general, there were 
more indications than in the CAEAS of a closer correspondence between contracting/consulting 
and regular, open-ended employment. As before, the descriptive statistics and probit regressions 
are available from the authors upon request.
9 The 2000 and 2002 waves of the NLSY79 were unusable for the multinomial logit component of our employment 
continuity analysis. They do not provide information on the three labor market end-states, only indicating on this 
occasion whether or not the worker was employed.
12IV.  Findings
Results from the CAEAS/CPS
Simple descriptive statistics on the employment status of incumbents of the various job 
categories identified in the CAEAS/CPS one year after its administration are presented in Table 2 
for the pooled sample. 
(Table 2 near here)
The main features of the cross tabulations are as follows.  First, although regular or open-
ended employment is associated with greater employment stability than atypical work as a 
whole, atypical work is not a monolithic entity and some atypical workers are just as likely to be 
employed one year later as are regular workers. Second, there is little indication that initially 
serving an employer in an atypical work capacity before being inducted into open-ended 
employment serves to increase the employment stability enjoyed by screened workers: the 
slightly higher employment rate observed for screened workers is not statistically different from 
that observed for those hired directly into regular employment. Third, agency temporaries and 
on-call workers are much less likely than regular workers to be holding a job of some kind one 
year later. Part of this 8 to 10 percentage point discrepancy vis-à-vis regular work resides in their 
much higher exit rates into inactivity. No less that fourteen (thirteen) percent of agency 
temporaries (on-call workers) transition out of the labor force one year later. Also, their 
transitions into joblessness are between two and three times greater than those of regular 
workers. Fourth, direct-hire temporaries fare only marginally better than their agency temporary 
counterparts in terms of employment, while recording similar transition rates into inactivity and 
unemployment. Fifth, located at the other end of the spectrum are contract workers and 
independent contractors.  Their  employment  probabilities after  one year resemble regular 
employment. Transitions into unemployment can even be lower than for regular employment, 
and both groups are more prone to leave the labor force than are regular workers. Sixth, 
displacement rates among atypical workers are only materially higher for agency temps and 
direct-hire temporary workers. Unsurprisingly, of all those employed initially, independent 
contractors have the lowest displacement rates. Finally, the initially unemployed and the 
economically   inactive   record   the   least   favorable   outcomes.   Thus,   the   unemployed   are 
significantly less likely to enter into employment than regular and atypical workers and 
13significantly more likely to leave the workforce and be displaced; while for its part labor force 
inactivity is evidently a highly persistent state. The suggestion thus far is that some atypical 
workers are engaged in more precarious employment than are regular workers. But these 
tabulations are only suggestive. To proceed further, we must turn to our cet. par. analysis.
(Table 3 near here)
Results of fitting the multinomial logit model to the CAEAS data are given in Table 3. 
Recall that the coefficient estimates represent the impact that a worker possessing a particular 
characteristic (including being in atypical work) has on the probability of that individual 
subsequently being observed in a particular reference outcome (such as employment) than a 
worker with the reference characteristic. Table 3 uses two such reference characteristics. The first 
set of coefficient estimates (given in first and third columns) gives the likelihood that atypical 
workers are to be either employed or inactive, respectively, than unemployed one year later 
relative to the corresponding rates observed for regular workers. The employment stability of 
atypical work is here assessed against the yardstick of open-ended employment. The second set 
of coefficient estimates (in the second and fourth columns of the table) obtain when using initial 
unemployment as our reference characteristic. This latter exercise helps us determine whether 
engaging in atypical work is preferable to (continued) job search.
10
To give a concrete example, take the coefficient estimate for direct-hire temporaries in 
the first column of the table. Its negative sign implies that direct-hire temporaries are less likely 
to be employed one year later than they are to be unemployed when compared with the same 
relative probability observed for regular workers after one year. In contrast, their agency temp 
counterparts have rates of employment one year later that are no different from those observed 
for regular workers.
We also present the marginal effects estimated for each set of results in brackets. These 
estimates represent the increase, or decrease, in the independent probability that a worker 
possessing a particular characteristic will be observed in that labor market state than would a 
worker  possessing the reference characteristic.  Again, consider  the  result  for  direct-hire 
temporaries in the first column of the table. The estimated marginal effect of -0.072 suggests that 
direct-hire temporaries are seven percentage points less likely to be employed than are regular 
workers. Again recall that we are no longer conditioning this estimate on the likelihood of being 
10 These are summary findings. The full CAEAS/CPS results for Table 3 (and Table 4) are available from the authors 
upon request. 
14in the reference outcome of unemployment (as is the case in interpreting the coefficient 
estimate).
Continuing, the negative and statistically significant coefficient estimate for on-call work 
again  implies  such workers are significantly less likely to be subsequently observed in 
employment than unemployment relative to regular workers. Engaging in on-call work leads to a 
probability of being employed one year later that is roughly eight percentage points lower than 
obtains for regular workers.
Consistent with the descriptive material in Table 2, our cet. par. results confirm that 
atypical workers are not a monolithic group. Observe that contract work has no unfavorable 
labor market implications compared with regular employment, while there is some weak 
evidence that independent contractors enjoy a greater degree of employment continuity than 
regular workers.
11
As was the also the case in Table 2, we find little evidence that initially serving an 
‘apprenticeship’ in an alternative work arrangement increases employment continuity. That is, 
the coefficient estimate for screened workers, although of the expected positive sign, lacks 
significance at conventional levels.
As for the initially jobless, these individuals record a 22 percentage point reduction in the 
probability  of  being  employed rather  than  being  unemployed when  compared with the 
corresponding probability for regular workers. For its part, having initially left the labor force 
serves to decrease the likelihood that such individuals will be observed holding a job one year 
later by nearly fifty percentage points.
The coefficient estimates contained in the third column of Table 3 chart the likelihood 
that a worker possessing a particular characteristic will move out of the labor force than be 
unemployed one year later relative to the corresponding likelihood for a regular worker. With the 
exception  of  independent  contractors,  there  is   scant  evidence  of  statistically  significant 
differences in labor force attachment across the various forms of atypical work. Consistent with 
11 Note that, in the case of independent contracting, we obtain an estimate of the marginal effect that is of opposite 
sign to the coefficient estimate. This result is possible when there is a dominant relative outcome associated with one 
particular characteristic. In this case, it would appear that independent contractors are  much  less likely to be 
unemployed than they are to be employed relative to the corresponding likelihood for regular workers. As was 
evident in Table 2, only a very small fraction of independent contractors are subsequently reported as being 
unemployed. Rather, they tend to be either employed or to quit the labor force one year later. When we focus solely 
upon the independent likelihood of being observed as employed one year later, therefore, we find that independent 
contractors are about three percentage points less likely to be employed than are regular workers.
15the tabulations presented in Table 2, those out of the labor force at the time of the CAEAS are 
more likely (47 percentage points) to be economically inactive than they are to be unemployed 
when compared with regular workers.
12  
In sum, we have found that regular work is associated with a greater degree of 
employment stability than direct-hire temporaries and on-call workers. But agency temporaries, 
contract workers and independent contractors are as likely or even slightly more to be employed 
than to be unemployed one year later compared to regular workers. Also there is every indication 
that   atypical   work   provides   workers   with   greater   employment   stability   than   initial 
unemployment.
But all of this pertains to the reference characteristic of open-ended employment. The 
coefficient estimates in the second column of Table 3 represent the likelihood that a worker in 
either an atypical job or open-ended employment will be employed rather than be unemployed 
one year later when compared with the corresponding likelihood for an initially unemployed 
individual. Positively signed coefficients imply that a particular characteristic, say agency 
temporary employment, results in a greater likelihood that such a worker will be subsequently 
employed than unemployed than his or her counterpart who had continued searching for a job. 
It can be seen that agency temps are, in fact, more likely to be employed one year later 
than are the initially jobless. The estimated marginal effect would suggest that taking an agency 
temporary position increases the probability of holding employment of some kind one year later 
by twelve percentage points vis-à-vis those initially unemployed. Similar advantages over the 
initially unemployed attach to direct-hire temping (fifteen percent) and on-call work (fourteen 
percent) in this regard.
We are less surprised to observe such favorable relative outcomes among contract 
workers and independent contractors since they appear to enjoy the same employment stability 
as regular workers. Nonetheless, these two alternative work arrangements increase by twenty-
four and twenty percentage points, respectively, the likelihood that their incumbents will be 
employed relative to the initially unemployed. Regular and screened workers have an increase in 
their employment probabilities that are of the same magnitude.
12 The signs of the coefficient estimate and that of the marginal effect are opposite for the initially jobless.  Again, 
this not a surprising result given the dominance of the continued unemployment outcome for this group who are 
much more likely to continue searching for work than they are to leave the labor force. In absolute terms, however, 
we see that initially being jobless serves to increase the probability of exiting the labor market 18 percentage points 
beyond that observed for regular workers.
16Although in the fourth column of the table, we estimate positive coefficient estimates for 
regular and screened workers exiting the labor force, these results should not be construed as 
implying such individuals exhibit lesser attachment to the labor market than do the initially 
unemployed. Thus, when we examine the unconditional estimates – the marginal effects – we 
observe that they are indeed less likely to be moving out of the labor force than are the initially 
unemployed. Again, given the very strong propensity of the initially jobless to remain in this 
(unemployed) labor market state, we will estimate coefficients and marginal effects that may not 
be of the same sign. To further illustrate, note that the five atypical work forms also appear to 
point to weaker labor market attachment (than for the initially unemployed). But in all cases the 
marginal effects are again negative.  
Turning briefly to the controls, we see that the coefficients for tenure and its quadratic are 
of the expected sign and statistically significant. Each year of tenure that workers accumulate 
with their employer increases the probability of being employed one year later by slightly more 
than one percentage point. For its part, the coefficient estimate for the average unemployment 
rate in a state over the course of the year – designed to hold constant labor market conditions – 
suggests that higher levels of joblessness serve to decrease the likelihood that a worker will be 
employed one year later. Each one percentage point increase in the unemployment rate decreases 
the likelihood of holding a job by about one and one-half percentage points. However, although 
the coefficient estimates for the number of children under the age of six in the household are of 
the expected sign, they lack significance at conventional levels. Note that we report only two sets 
of results for the labor market controls since the coefficients are not influenced by the reference 
category. 
Finally, the likelihood ratio tests at the foot of Table 3 serve to indicate that atypical work 
is not a homogeneous grouping. The tests reject the possibility, at the .01 level, that the five 
different forms of atypical work hold uniform implications for a worker’s subsequent labor 
market outcomes. It would appear that we can aggregate agency temporaries and their direct-hire 
counterparts into one composite category, as well as fold contract workers in with independent 
contractors. What appears to be the case, however, is that contracting work is dissimilar from 
either temporary or on-call work, in its labor market outcomes. Moreover, the final hypothesis 
test rejects the possibility that open-ended employment affords workers with the same degree of 
17employment continuity as atypical work as a whole. The on-net interpretation is that regular 
work is preferable to atypical work which is, in turn, preferable to being unemployed.
(Table 4 near here)
The second measure of employment stability available in the CAEAS/CPS data is the 
likelihood the worker will be displaced over that course of one year. We present summary results 
from the logistic estimation results in Table 4. Again, we use two reference characteristics. That 
is, the results in the first (second) column of the table use regular employment (initial 
unemployment) as the reference characteristic. 
Beginning with the former, we again fail to uncover any evidence that being inducted into 
the regular workforce after a spell as an atypical worker does much in the way to enhance 
employment stability: the coefficient estimate for screened workers is statistically insignificant. 
Much  of the difference  in  the  displacement rates  between  regular workers  and agency 
temporaries pointed to in Table 2 seems on closer inspection to be the function of observed 
differences in worker characteristics. Thus, the coefficient estimate for agency temporaries is not 
statistically different from zero. That said, their direct direct-hire counterparts, are more likely to 
be displaced over the course of a year, and although the one percentage point increase might 
appear small it will be recalled from Table 2 that that regular workers have displacement rates of 
a little more than two percent. Independent contractors have a displacement probability that is 
just under one percentage point lower than that observed for regular workers.
The initially unemployed are more likely to see a (subsequent) job ending through 
dislocation than regular workers. That those initially out of the labor force are less likely to 
encounter a break in employment from displacement than are regular workers is not surprising: 
any dislocation effect will likely be dwarfed by the persistence of inactivity. 
From the second column of the table, when the initially unemployed are used as the 
reference characteristic, it would appear that atypical work does very little to improve a worker’s 
relative employment stability. Only regular and screened workers are likely to have lower rates 
of displacement over the course of a year. For this measure of employment continuity, at least, 
atypical workers fare just as poorly as those who continued their job search.  
As reported earlier, increased tenure serves to increase the stability of employment. 
Specifically, each year of tenure reduces the probability of being displaced over the course of a 
year about one-tenth of a percentage point. On this occasion, however, although the coefficient 
18estimate for the state average unemployment is of the expected sign, it is poorly determined. 
Young children in the household also have little explanatory power in this model.
Finally, as was also true for the multinomial logit estimates, it seems that not all atypical 
workers share the same labor market experience with respect to displacement. The likelihood 
ratio tests at the foot of the table suggest that aggregating the five different types of atypical work 
in our logit analyses is inappropriate. The last row entry again leads to the conclusion that 
atypical work fails on net to provide the same degree of employment security as open-ended 
employment. Indeed, as we have seen, atypical workers are just as likely as the jobless to 
experience displacement.
Results from the NLSY79
Descriptive statistics on the employment status of the various work arrangements identified in 
the NLSY79 data are presented in Table 5. We construct two cross sections spanning two-year 
intervals and a third cross section covering a ‘full’ four-year period. Workers are classified 
according to the work arrangement in which they are employed at the beginning of each cross 
section. Although the same individuals overlap across each cross section, they may of course be 
subsequently employed in a different work arrangement (a theme that is taken up below).
 (Table 5 near here)
Generally, the NLSY79 descriptive statistics  mirror those reported earlier for the 
CAEAS/CPS, although they are perhaps sharper. Thus, the two types of open-ended employment 
are associated with higher levels of (subsequent) employment relative to atypical work in the 
NLSY79. And for each cross section, both forms of temporary work are associated with 
considerably lower employment rates relative to regular work. Much as was the case for the 
CAEAS/CPS, the now consolidated category of contractors and consultants enjoy a degree of 
employment  stability   not   greatly  dissimilar   from   that  of   open-ended   employment.  The 
probability that they will be unemployed is actually lower than that for regular workers and 
likely reflects their greater propensity to leave the labor force. More than two-thirds of those who 
were initially unemployed are in employment two and four years later. Such individuals evince 
unemployment rates that are significantly higher than those associated with either regular or 
atypical work. And over one-half of non-participants remain out of the labor force two and four 
years years later.
19Our third and final measure of employment stability is reported in the last row of each of 
the panels in Table 5, namely, the fraction of time between each interview that the respondent 
reported being employed. Open-ended employment is again associated with a higher level of 
employment continuity relative to temporary work, with contractors/consultants more or less on 
on a par with regular workers. Over the course of two years, regular and screened workers are 
employed about 94 percent of the time, or some 22.6 months.  For their part, agency temporaries 
report being employed 78 to 81 percent of the time for the two-year cross sections. Direct-hire 
temporaries seemingly fare the worst: they can expect to be employed for about three-quarters of 
the time in any two years. For the residual non-employment categories, the measure of 
employment continuity is lowest of all. This is most notable in the case of the economically 
inactive. But for such individuals and the initially unemployed, employment rates rise the longer 
the cross section.  
(Table 6 near here)
Multinomial logit regressions of the labor market outcomes after two years are provided 
in Table 6.
13 The estimates were obtained by aggregating (using year dummies) both of the 
usable two-year cross sections into a single pooled sample. We control for the cross-correlation 
in the error terms for individuals contained within each of the two-year cross sections and 
present robust clustered standard errors. The first and third (second and fourth) columns present 
results using regular workers (the initially unemployed) as the reference characteristic.
Use of regular workers as the reference characteristic uncovers little evidence that 
atypical work yields significantly different labor market outcomes, ceteris paribus. From the first 
column of the table we see that being employed in either type of temporary work or in 
contracting/consulting neither increases nor decreases the likelihood that its incumbents will be 
employed two years hence rather than being unemployed when compared with regular workers. 
We also detect little in the way of differential labor market attachment of atypical workers. Thus, 
the corresponding result in the third column suggests that atypical workers are just as likely as 
regular workers to be out of the labor force than to be unemployed. Taken as a whole, therefore, 
these findings suggest that the distribution of outcomes for agency and direct-hire temporaries 
and contractors/consultants are much  the same as for regular workers.  Only individuals 
employed in other work types are (about five percentage points) less likely to be observed 
13 The results in Table 6 (and Tables 7 and 8) are again provided in summary form. Full multinomial logit and panel 
estimates are available from the authors upon request.   
20holding employment two years later than are regular workers. It is the initially unemployed that 
fare particularly poorly vis-à-vis regular workers. Specifically, they are some nine percentage 
points less likely to be subsequently unemployed than are regular workers. Like the initially 
unemployed, those initially out of the labor force are less (more) likely to be employed (out of 
the labor force) two years later than to be unemployed relative to regular workers.
The second and fourth columns of Table 6 use the initially unemployed as the reference 
category. Evidently, regular, screened, agency temporary, and contracting/consulting workers are 
all more likely to be employed two years later than they are to be unemployed compared with the 
initially unemployed (in the range six to eleven percentage points). But those who initially hold a 
job of any kind fail to display different attachment to the labor market than the initially 
unemployed.
The effects of the controls are mixed. General labor market experience apparently plays 
little or no role in explaining the subsequent employment rates experienced by our NLSY79 
samples, but does reduce the likelihood that workers will subsequently leave the labor force. 
Unsurprisingly, tenure is associated with a higher probability of being employed: each year of 
employment that a worker acquires with his or her employer increases the probability of holding 
a job two years later by slightly more than one percentage point. As for those individuals who 
held a larger number of jobs in the past, it would appear that they experience diminished future 
employment stability. Each prior job held decreases the likelihood that a worker will be observed 
in employment by about one percentage point. Contrary to the CAEAS/CPS results, local labor 
market conditions are no longer statistically significant,
14  although the presence of young 
children does serve to increase the likelihood a worker will subsequently leave the labor force.
The results of our hypothesis tests appear at the foot of the table. From the first row, we 
see that the distribution of outcomes for agency temporaries is not significantly different from 
that associated with direct-hire temping. Unlike the CAEAS/CPS results, however, it would seem 
that one can aggregate the various types of atypical work into one composite category since we 
fail to reject the possibility that contracting/consulting, temporary work and other work types 
hold similar implications for a worker’s labor market outcomes (second row entries). The 
findings in the final row  suggest that atypical  work and the  two forms of open-ended 
employment hold different implications for future labor market outcomes.
14 Although we note that the NLSY79 does not report the unemployment rate in continuous form, necessitating the 
deployment of categorical variables.
21(Table 7 near here)
Turning next to the longer, four-year cross section in Table 7, we uncover further 
evidence  that   initially  holding  employment  of  some  kind  may  be  preferable   to  initial 
unemployment.  That is to say, when using regular employment as our reference characteristic, 
we  observe   that   workers   in   two   types   of   atypical   work   –   temporary   workers
15  and 
contractors/consultants   –  experience  not   dissimilar   labor  market  outcomes  from  regular 
workers.
16  
We now see a suggestion that those who were initially screened for a regular position 
through atypical work are slightly more likely to be employed in 1998 than they are to be 
unemployed when compared with those hired directly into regular work. Initially serving one’s 
employer in an atypical work arrangement increases the probability of being employed four 
years later by two percentage points compared with regular workers. We also see that those who 
are initially unemployed are (around twelve percentage points) less likely to be holding 
employment of some kind four years later than are regular workers. On the other hand, the 
negative coefficient estimate for those initially out of the labor force is not statistically 
significant. 
Using the initially unemployed as the reference category in the second column of Table 7 
reveals that not only regular and screened workers are significantly more likely to be observed as 
being employed after four years than are the jobless but also temporary workers as well. Finally, 
as regards the out of the labor force outcome in the last two columns of the table, we find that 
only those initially observed in this labor market state have a heightened probability of  being 
inactive four years later.
Turning briefly to the human capital variables, the results are broadly as expected. Thus, 
tenure is positively correlated with the probability of being employed four years later, while 
experience is negatively associated with labor market withdrawal (if not employment). Again, 
having held a large number of jobs in the past reduces (by about one percentage point) a 
worker’s (ongoing) employment stability over the course of four years. As was the case in our 
15 We now fold agency temporaries and direct-hire temporaries into a single composite temporary category as there 
are no agency temporaries recorded as unemployed in 1998.
16 One concern with this statement is that temporary employment is a transient feature of a worker’s employment 
history. Accordingly, we may be understating the longer-run implications of such employment if workers are 
transitioning into regular employment over the course of the four years covered by this cross section. Tabulations of 
the NLSY79 data reveal that this is the case for 53 percent of those initially employed as temporary workers in 1994.
22discussion of worker transitions over two years, the coefficient estimates for the (categorical) 
unemployment variables lack significance throughout. Also, we again see that increases in small 
children serve only to influence the likelihood of quitting the labor force.
We now turn to our final measure of employment continuity, replacing the comparison of 
an individual’s labor market status at a subsequent point in time with the fraction of time spent 
employed over the respective two- and four-year intervals. We adopt panel data estimation 
techniques to allow for the estimation of both a random and a fixed effects specification. Each 
model allows for the cross-correlation in the error term that arises when we have repeated 
observations on the same individual. The fixed effects linear model improves upon the random 
effects specification by allowing for an individual-specific intercept, which should capture the 
effect that unobserved heterogeneity – such as worker motivation or ability – has on employment 
continuity. This unobserved heterogeneity may be particularly problematic if it is biasing our 
results regarding the amount of time a worker is employed between the various waves of our 
NLSY79 data.
(Table 8 near here)
The three two-year cross sections were pooled to estimate the models contained in the 
first four columns of Table 8, and the three four-year cross sections to obtain the results 
contained in the last four columns of the table. As before, there are two reference categories – 
namely, those initially employed as regular workers and those initially unemployed – for each 
model estimated.
Beginning with the two-year results, we observe that both types of temporary workers are 
employed for less time than are  regular workers. The estimated  coefficient for agency 
temporaries implies that initially being employed in this work arrangement serves to reduce by 
about 4.2 percentage points the fraction of time spent in employment over a two-year interval 
vis-à-vis regular workers, ceteris paribus. This means that an agency temp is employed for about 
1.1 months less than a comparable regular worker. Direct-hire temporaries fare even worse: they 
are employed 8.5 percentage points less than regular workers. But there is no significant 
difference in time spent employed for contractors and consultants. Similarly, there appears to be 
no advantage accruing to having been previously screened in an atypical work arrangement. But 
engaging in a work form other than open-ended or atypical work appears to reduce by 3.6 
percentage points the time that an individual will be employed over the course of two years.
23When we take the labor market experience of the initially unemployed as our reference 
category (column 2), it is very clearly the case that workers in employment ab initio irrespective 
of their particular work arrangement are more likely than their initially unemployed counterparts 
to spend more time employed over the course of two years. Specifically, agency (direct-hire) 
temps are employed eighteen (fourteen) percentage points more than the initially unemployed. 
For contractors/consultants, the corresponding advantage is about twenty-two percentage points. 
As expected, workers engaged in open-ended employment, be it regular or screened, enjoy 
among the greatest degree of employment continuity. Only the initially economically inactive are 
employed for less than the initially unemployed: the disparity is around twenty-three percentage 
points.
The labor market variables are largely of the expected sign. Having greater general labor 
market experience increases the percentage of employed time, as do greater levels of tenure with 
a firm. Those who report having a greater number of jobs in the past appear to not be 
significantly impacted, although having (additional) children under six in the household does 
serve to materially reduce the fraction of the two-years that a worker reports being employed. 
The coefficient estimates for the unemployment variables, while statistically insignificant, are 
largely of the expected (negative) sign.
Turning to the fixed effects results (in columns 3 and 4 of Table 8), we see that the 
estimated coefficients are clearly diminished in absolute magnitude, implying that unobserved 
characteristics are upwardly biasing our results. Workers engaged in either atypical or regular 
work may be more able workers or possess other characteristics that are associated with greater 
employment stability. Abstracting from other work types, comparing the results presented in 
column 3 with those in column 1, only the coefficient estimate for direct-hire temporaries retains 
its significance – and its absolute magnitude is halved. Atypicals as a group now broadly 
resemble regular workers whose employment continuity is also exaggerated in the random 
effects specification. Comparing the results contained in column 4 with those in column 2, there 
are still generally positive returns to atypical work per se but the benefits in terms of time spent 
employed are again halved after allowing for unobserved heterogeneity. And in one case – 
direct-hire temporaries – the coefficient estimate is not statistically insignificant.
For the two types of jobless individuals, we see that much of their seemingly-reduced 
employment continuity again stems from unobserved heterogeneity. The random effects results 
24would imply that the initially unemployed (out of the labor force) are employed for twenty-two 
(forty-five) percentage points over a two-year period than are regular workers. When the fixed 
effect estimator is used, both coefficients are reduced by more than one-half in absolute 
magnitude.
Turning to the four-year results (the last four columns of Table 8), when compared with 
regular workers, we now find that atypicals (with one exception) are employed for similar 
intervals as regular workers. That is to say, the results presented in column 5 of the table would 
imply that both agency temps and contractors/consultants experience no penalty over a four-year 
period when compared to their counterparts in open-ended employment. Only direct-hire temps 
are less continuously employed: about 4.5 percentage points (or approximately nine months) less 
than regular workers.
Although of a lesser magnitude than the two-year results, our two types of initially 
jobless individuals still face a significant disadvantage relative to regular workers. Those initially 
unemployed (out of the labor force) are employed for ten (twenty-four) percentage points less 
than individuals who are initially employed in regular work.
The results presented in column 6 of the table imply that taking a job of any kind, be it 
regular or atypical, serves to increase the employment continuity over that enjoyed by the 
initially   jobless.   We   find   that   both   types   of   open-ended   employment   as   well   as 
contractors/consultants are employed for about ten percentage points more than the initially 
jobless. Agency (direct-hire) temporaries have employment rates that are approximately eight 
(five) percentage points higher.
As was the case with our two-year results, we find that the random effects estimator 
produces coefficient estimates that are sharper in absolute magnitude than the fixed effects. Not 
surprisingly given the results obtained in the random effects model, after controlling for 
unobserved heterogeneity, there appears to be no difference between regular and atypical 
workers (column 7). More importantly, for the two types of jobless individuals, the fixed effects 
estimator produces coefficient estimates that are much reduced, implying that a good deal of the 
disparity between these two labor market states and regular work can be attributed to something 
other than status.
Finally, the advantage that those who initially held a job might have over the initially 
unemployed vanishes once we take into consideration unobserved heterogeneity. In contrasting 
25the results contained in column 8 with those in column 6, the suggestion is that those who 
initially held a job might be more able individuals or have more favorable (unobserved) 
characteristics which result in greater employment continuity than the initially unemployed. 
The results of the hypothesis tests located at the foot of Table 8 are not surprising. When 
we fail to take into consideration unobserved heterogeneity, we find that aggregating atypical 
workers into one composite group is inappropriate. The results obtained from the fixed effects 
models would suggest that, after controlling for unobserved worker characteristics, there are no 
significant differences observed across the different atypical work forms.
One of the concerns of the fixed effects estimator is that if the unobserved heterogeneity 
is changing over time (e.g. one’s preference for a particular work type), then the results are still 
going to be biased. We sought to take this concern into consideration by including number of 
pre-school children in the household. Presumably, their presence might make some types of 
atypical work more attractive given their flexibility in scheduling or hours. We find that, for both 
the two- and four-year results, the coefficient estimates of this variable are both statistically 
significant and negatively-signed. The fixed effects estimator produces coefficient estimates that 
are sharply lower in magnitude but generally significant.
Our analysis of the NLSY79 data provides some support for a more positive view of 
atypical work as a whole, at least over the medium-term. The evidence obtained from the 
multinomial logits would imply that the distribution of employment outcomes after two (and 
four) years is no different for atypicals than for regular workers. And both types of worker are 
more likely to be observed in employment at the end of either two or four years than are the 
initially jobless.
In analyzing the fraction of time employed over a two-year period, however, we uncover 
evidence that atypicals are employed less continuously than are regular workers. Nevertheless, 
this disadvantage is greatly mitigated once unobserved heterogeneity is taken into consideration, 
while the observed advantage associated with atypical employment over the initially unemployed 
remains. Over the course of four years, we see that only the initially inactive experience lower 
employment continuity when we allow for unobserved heterogeneity.
 
V.  Conclusions
26At first blush, our analysis of both the CAEAS/CPS and much of the NLSY79 data provides 
support for the use of atypical work as a means of extending employment continuity and stability 
relative to continued job search. That is to say, we find that atypicals of all stripes are more likely 
to be employed at subsequent periods in time than the initially unemployed. In addition, these 
work arrangements might increase the amount of time spent in employment.
However, when we compare the employment stability of atypical work with that of open-
ended employment, the evidence is mixed. The CAEAS/CPS results would suggest that temps 
and on-call workers are seemingly less likely to be subsequently employed after one year than 
are regular workers. The NLSY79 results, however, fail to produce any significant coefficient 
estimates over longer intervals. We can rule out one potential explanation for this: the limited 
cohort contained in the NLSY79 data. When we re-estimated the multinomial logit using 
CAEAS/CPS data restricted to the age cohort contained within the NLSY79, the results were 
broadly as before. In short, it is not cohort that is producing the differences between the two 
surveys.
 It may be tempting to conclude from the multinomial logits that, when faced with 
continued job search and an offer of atypical work, atypical work is the preferable outcome. This 
also appears to be the case using our final duration-based measure of employment stability at 
least over a two year interval. That is to say, even after controlling for unobserved worker 
characteristics, there still is a significant advantage from opting to take atypical work over 
continued job-search. Over a longer four-year interval, however, much of the “benefit” enjoyed 
by atypicals over the initially unemployed dissipates. Equally on this measure, over the same 
time period, differences between regular work and atypical work disappear.
The bottom line of the present study therefore is that the sharpest differences between 
atypical workers, regular workers and initially unemployed workers obtain when one does not 
account for unobserved individual heterogeneity. The differences in employment continuity 
associated with the initial labor markets states are apparently less a function of the arrangements 
themselves than the unobserved characteristics of the workers filling them.
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30Table 1: Descriptions of worker categories in the CAEAS/CPS and NLSY79
Work Category CAEAS/CPS data NLSY79 data
Regular workers Workers who are directly hired into open-
ended, regular employment. Initially hired 
using standard interview techniques and 
without having been first screened through an 
atypical work arrangement.
Same as CAEAS/CPS.
Screened workers Workers who are employed in open-ended 
employment, but who indicate that they 
earlier worked for the same firm in an 
alternative work arrangement. No break in 
employment with the firm is reported.
Same as CAEAS/CPS.
Agency temporaries Workers are employed by a temporary help 
service agency and who rely on this agency to 
secure their clients/projects.
Same as CAEAS/CPS.
Direct-hire temporaries Workers hired directly by a firm in a 
temporary position. This category also 
includes those who indicate that they are hired 
directly by the client firm to fill a temporary 
position, complete a specific project, or 
substitute for an absent or vacationing 
employee. Also included are those who are 
hired for only a fixed period of time or into 
jobs that are seasonal in nature.
Workers who indicate that they are 
temporary in nature and hired 
directly by the paycheck-issuing 
firm.
On-call workers Workers hired into a per-diem or as-needed 
position. This category also includes those 
who indicate they are day laborers.
Not able to be identified in the data.
Contract company workers Workers who are employed by a company 
that contracts out their services to a client 
firm. This category is restricted to those 
workers who were assigned to only one client 
and worked primarily at the client’s premises.
Not able to be identified in the data.
Independent contractors Self-employed consultants and contractors 
who are responsible for the acquisition of 
their own clients or projects.
Not uniquely identifiable in the data.
Contractors/consultants An aggregated category comprising 
both contract company workers and 
independent contractors.
Other work types Workers employed in any other 
arrangement. This work arrangement 
typically includes the self-employed, 
and the CAEAS work forms not 
uniquely identifiable in the NLSY.
Initially unemployed Those workers who do not have a job, but 
who are searching for one.
Same as CAEAS/CPS.
Initially out of the labor 
force
Those individuals who do not have a job and 
who are not searching for one.
Same as CAEAS/CPS.
31Table 2:  Labor Market Outcomes One Year Later, Pooled CAEAS/CPS Data
Regular Screened Agency Direct-hire On-call Contract Independent Initially Initially out of
workers workers temporaries temporaries workers workers contractors unemployed labor force
Employed 91.3% 92.2% 80.7% 85.3% 82.7% 91.6% 89.5% 56.5% 18.3%
Unemployed 2.0 1.4 5.6 3.9 4.1 0.8 1.5 18.2 2.2
Out of labor force 6.7 6.4 13.6 10.8 13.2 7.5 9.1 25.4 79.5
Displaced 2.1 2.7 4.6 4.4 2.8 2.5 1.2 6.4 0.7
32Table 3:  Multinomial Logit Analyses of Labor Market Outcomes One Year Later, Pooled CAEAS/CPS Data. 
(base outcome is being unemployed one year later)
Employed Out of Labor Force






Screened 0.295 2.513*** 0.241 1.130***
workers (0.224) (0.368) (0.246) (0.402)
[0.013] [0.237] [-0.006] [-0.185]
Agency -0.393 1.825*** 0.281 1.170***
temporaries (0.255) (0.387) (0.285) (0.427)
[-0.100] [0.124] [0.093] [-0.085]
Direct-hire -0.623*** 1.595*** -0.185 0.704**
temporaries (0.119) (0.313) (0.135) (0.343)
[-0.072] [0.152] [0.059] [-0.119]
On-call -0.533** 1.684*** -0.012 0.877**
workers (0.225) (0.369) (0.250) (0.405)
[-0.081] [0.142] [0.071] [-0.107]
Contract company 0.768 2.986*** 0.758 1.647*
workers (0.717) (0.775) (0.779) (0.842)
[0.016] [0.239] [0.002] [-0.177]
Independent 0.222* 2.440*** 0.419*** 1.308***
contractors (0.132) (0.315) (0.144) (0.342)






Initially out  -1.326*** 0.892*** 2.065*** 2.954***
of labor force (0.298) (0.076) (0.323) (0.080)











Kids under -0.009 0.039




33 AT= DT:  =2.89 (p=0.235)
 CW= IC:  =1.03 (p=0.598)
 AT= DT= OC= CW= IC:  =43.00 (p=0.000)
 RW= SW= AT= DT= OC= CW= IC:  =101.68 (p=0.000)
 
Notes:  
1Denotes the reference category. All analyses include year dummies. Marginal effects are given in brackets. Additional controls are age 
(and age
2), gender and ethnicity controls, a dummy variable equal to one if married (zero otherwise), an interaction term between gender (being 
female) and marital status, five educational dummies (omitted category is no high school diploma), a dummy variable equal to one if residing in 
an urban area (zero otherwise), four regional dummies (omitted category is living in the South), ten industry dummies (the omitted category is 
agriculture/fishing/forestry), and six occupational dummies (the omitted category is manager).
*** ,**, * denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.
34Table 4:  Logit Analysis of Displacement One Year Later, Pooled CAEAS/CPS Data



























Initially out -1.266*** -2.168***

















 AT= DT  =2.95 (p=0.086)
35 CW= IC:  =1.04 (p=0.308)
 AT= DT= OC= CW= IC:  =41.64 (p=0.000)
 RW= SW= AT= DT= OC= CW= IC:  =44.84 (p=0.000)
Notes:  
1Denotes the reference category.  See notes to Table 3.
36Table 5:  Labor Market Outcomes For Selected Waves of  NLSY79
Regular Screened Agency Direct-Hire Contractors/ Other Initially Initially out of
workers workers temporaries temporaries consultants work types unemployed labor force
(a). 1994 – 1996
Employed 92.0% 93.0% 77.9% 79.2% 87.9% 85.4% 68.7% 35.0%
Unemployed 2.9 1.7 7.5 5.7 1.5 4.4 13.1 5.1
Out of labor force 5.2 5.3 14.6 15.1 10.5 10.1 18.2 59.9
Fraction of time employed93.3 94.0 78.0 75.0 89.2 89.0 59.7 24.2
(c). 1998 – 2000
1
Fraction of time employed94.2 96.1 80.9 77.8 95.2 90.3 40.6 18.8
(d). 1994 – 1998
Employed 91.4 92.9 79.4 83.7 88.2 86.0 72.4 44.4
Unemployed 2.3 1.5 0.0 4.8 1.3 3.7 11.7 4.5
Out of labor force 6.3 5.6 20.6 11.5 10.6 10.3 15.9 51.1
Fraction of time employed92.3 93.0 75.3 79.2 90.5 88.5 66.2 32.4
Note: 
1Labor market states past 1998 (i.e. 2000 and 2002) cannot be identified. See footnote 9.
37Table 6:  Multinomial Logit Analyses of Labor Market Outcomes Two Years Later, NLSY79 Data (base outcome is 
unemployed two years later)
Employed Out of Labor Force






Screened  0.179 1.306*** 0.023 0.348
workers (0.212) (0.437) (0.260) (0.529)
[0.016] [0.107] [-0.011] [-0.069]
Agency 0.270 1.397** 0.453 0.777
temporaries (0.382) (0.540) (0.453) (0.650)
[-0.006] [0.085] [0.015] [-0.043]
Direct-hire -0.271 0.856 0.500 0.825
temporaries (0.386) (0.549) (0.444) (0.648)
[-0.064] [0.027] [0.058] [-0.000]
Contractors/ 0.340 1.467** 0.848 1.173
consultants (0.524) (0.648) (0.566) (0.724)
[-0.028] [0.063] [0.040] [-0.019]
Other work -0.601** 0.526 -0.148 0.177
types (0.251) (0.413) (0.297) (0.508)






Initially out  -0.926** 0.202 1.366*** 1.690***
of labor force  (0.379) (0.140) (0.457) (0.153)


















Kids under  -0.001 0.195***
sixyears old (0.064) (0.068)
[-0.014] [0.015]
3 – 6% Local -0.552 -0.192
unemployment rate (0.723) (0.792)
[-0.042] [0.026]
6 – 9% Local -0.697 -0.316
unemployment rate (0.721) (0.791)
[-0.048] [0.027]
9 – 12% Local -0.663 -0.079
unemployment rate (0.735) (0.806)
[-0.062] [0.043]
12 – 15% Local -0.791 -0.279
unemployment rate (0.740) (0.812)
[-0.060] [0.043]
> 15% Local -0.758 -0.216




 A T = DT:  =1.06 (p=0.304)
 A T= DT= C/C= OWT:  =7.87 (p=0.248)
 RW= SW= AT= DT= C/C= OWT:  =26.36 (p=0.003)
Notes: 
1Denotes the reference category. All analyses include year dummies. Marginal effects are given in brackets. Additional controls are age 
(and age
2), gender and ethnicity controls, a dummy variable equal to one if married (zero otherwise), an interaction term between gender (being 
female) and marital status, education (in years), a dummy variable equal to one if residing in an urban area (zero otherwise), four regional 
dummies (omitted category is living in the South), ten industry dummies (the omitted category is agriculture/fishing/forestry), and six 
occupational dummies (the omitted category is manager).
.
*** ,**, * denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.
39Table 7:  Multinomial Logit Analyses of Labor Market Outcomes Four Years Later, NLSY79 Data (base outcome is 
unemployed four years later)
Employed Out of Labor Force






Screened 0.724* 1.800** 0.658 0.547
workers (0.427) (0.722) (0.468) (0.843)
[0.022] [0.141] [-0.004] [-0.099]
Temporary 0.803 1.877** 0.845 0.733
workers (0.613) (0.833) (0.651) (0.942)
[0.015] [0.134] [0.005] [-0.090]
Contractors/ 0.346 1.422 0.865 0.753
consultants (0.736) (0.930) (0.790) (0.942)
[-0.034] [0.086] [0.043] [-0.052]
Other work -0.732* 0.343 -0.391 -0.503
types (0.383) (0.649) (0.447) (0.782)






Initially out -0.944 0.131 1.325* 1.214***
of labor force (0.587) (0.199) (0.701) (0.216)


















40Kids under 0.069 0.194**
six years old (0.087) (0.091)
[-0.008] [0.011]
3 – 6% Local 0.975 0.562
unemployment rate (1.073) (1.148)
[0.055] [-0.032]
6 – 9% Local 0.600 0.161
unemployment rate (1.073) (1.152)
[0.049] [-0.035]
9 – 12% Local 0.434 0.197
unemployment rate (1.080) (1.156)
[0.029] [-0.019]
12 – 15% Local 0.883 0.477
unemployment rate (1.118) (1.195)
[0.053] [-0.031]
>15% Local 0.580 0.274




 A T = DT:  =1.06 (p=0.304)
 A T= DT= C/C= OWT:  =7.87 (p=0.248)
 RW= SW= AT= DT= C/C= OWT:  =26.36 (p=0.003)
Notes: 
1Denotes the reference category; see Notes to Table 6.
41Table 8: OLS Panel Estimates of Employment Continuity, NLSY79 Data (dependent variable is fraction of time employed)
Over Two Years Over Four Years






workers (1.710) (1.994) (1.618) (2.109)
Screened 0.844* 22.916*** 0.453 8.929*** 0.211 9.918*** -0.083 2.112
workers (0.512) (1.756) (0.586) (2.037) (0.471) (1.655) (0.543) (2.152)
Agency -4.178** 17.893*** -1.287 7.189** -1.865 7.841** -1.021 1.175
temporaries (1.996) (2.594) (2.069) (2.836) (1.801) (2.296) (1.990) (2.874)
Direct-hire -8.452*** 13.620*** -4.855** 3.620 -4.494*** 5.212** -2.224 -0.025
temporaries (2.181) (2.812) (2.247) (3.059) (1.661) (2.367) (1.780) (2.780)
Contractors/ 0.264 22.336*** -0.327 8.802*** 0.461 10.167*** -0.859 3.055
consultants (0.992) (1.950) (0.990) (2.201) (1.036) (1.872) (1.158) (2.341)
Other work -3.568*** 18.503*** -2.783** 5.692** -2.821*** 6.886*** -1.460 0.735






unemployed (1.170) (1.994) (1.618) (2.109)
Initially out  -45.019*** -22.948*** -18.969*** -10.494*** -24.005*** -14.299*** -6.935*** -4.740***
of labor force (1.496) (1.386) (1.917) (1.375) (1.526) (1.108) (2.042) (1.158)
Experience 3.706*** -10.840** 4.422*** -9.493***
(0.186) (0.552) (0.218) (0.569)
Experience
2 -0.103*** 0.008 -0.121*** 0.033***
(0.007) (0.013) (0.008) (0.014)
Tenure 0.335*** -0.864*** -0.324*** -0.720***
(0.096) (0.124) (0.093) (0.120)
42Tenure
2 -0.014** 0.040*** 0.022*** 0.038***
(0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.008)
Jobs -0.245 4.778*** -0.460** 3.461***
(0.149) (0.902) (0.211) (0.639)
Kids under -1.190*** -0.578* -1.193*** -0.654**
six years old (0.217) (0.301) (0.224) (0.201)
3 – 6% Local -0.003 -0.147 0.129 -0.130
unemployment rate (0.600) (0.684) (0.545) (0.669)
6 – 9% Local -0.082 -0.115 -0.225 -0.277
unemployment rate (0.673) (1.382) (0.629) (0.794)
9 – 12% Local  -0.380 0.714 -0.920 -0.096
unemployment rate (0.824) (1.029) (0.765) (0.970)
12 – 15% Local -0.811 0.741 -0.455 0.578
unemployment rate (0.933) (1.062) (0.792) (0.945)
> 15% Local 1.098 4.133* 0.405 0.820
unemployment rate (1.520) (2.332) (1.678) (2.442)
R
2 0.60 0.21 0.53 0.27
n 22,644 22,644 21,109 21,109
Model RE FE RE FE
 AT= DT:  =2.17 (p=0.141)  =0.93 (p=0.336)  =1.28 (p=0.259)  =0.23 (p=0.631)
 AT= DT= C/C= OW T:  =17.55 (p=0.001)  =1.67 (p=0.243)  =9.75 (p=0.021)  =1.21 (p=0.306)
 RW= SW= AT= DT= C/C= OWT:  =34.32 (p=0.000)  =1.62 (p=0.150)  =9.73 (p=0.021)  =0.99 (p=0.422)
Notes: 
1Denotes the reference category. Additional controls are age (and age
2), gender and ethnicity controls, a dummy variable equal to one if married (zero otherwise), an interaction term between 
gender (being female) and marital status, education (in years), a dummy variable equal to one if residing in an urban area (zero otherwise), four regional dummies (omitted category is living in the 
South), ten industry dummies (the omitted category is agriculture/fishing/forestry), and six occupational dummies (the omitted category is manager).
*** ,**, * denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.
43